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Latin America and the Caribbean as a region faces an intricate process of transition. This 
process is conditioned by the changes currently ongoing in the international environment, by 
a reconfiguration of the regional political map and by an exhaustion of the attempts to build 
regionalization and political consensus of the preceding decade, associated at the time to the 
boom of commodities and the rise of populist and leftist governments. To the difficulties faced 
by CELAC — where the construction of consensuses by an atomized region vis a vis external 
actors becomes extremely difficult, it should be added the evident weakening of the ALBA 
with the exhaustion of the Venezuelan capacity to nourish with oil resources the cooperation 
that sustains the Bolivarian scheme and a crisis underway in UNASUR where — particularly 
as a result of the Venezuelan crisis and the paralysis of the institution — six of its member 
countries (half of its total membership) have questioned the functioning of the agency and 
threaten to withdraw their membership. Although the Venezuelan crisis may be the epicenter 
of this regional situation and its impact — possibly polarizing — on the crossroads that are 
confronting regionalism and regional integration, introspection is not enough. The potential 
convergence of MERCOSUR with the Pacific Alliance, the redefinition of the external policies 
of its members as a result of electoral changes or the re-shaping of its domestic dynamics do 
not fully explain the current shift and it is necessary to combine it with the understanding of 
the pressures imposed by a changing global environment, where the crisis of globalization, 
the difficulties to build global governance, the weakening of multilateralism and the decline of 
the international liberal order are associated with the reconfiguration and diffusion of power 
worldwide, within a framework of a series of developments plagued by uncertainties and risks 
for the region. In this perspective, this article addresses the different dimensions of global 
transformations and its impact on the region and the challenges that the region faces in order 
to adapt to the changes in the current international environment.
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1. The crisis of globalization, global governance and the international 
liberal order: a preamble to an emerging global order
The international system is undergoing a complex transition, with high levels 
of uncertainty and accelerated transformations, with tectonic changes that involve 
displacements and geo-economic and geopolitical reconfigurations at the global level1. 
1 As one specialist points out in a recent article, in today’s world “geoeconomic and geopolitical dy-
namics coexist, more or less intensely, delineating an unpredictable and fluctuating world scenario” [1]. 
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The characteristics of this global transition affect Latin America and the Caribbean, and 
demand a better understanding of its dynamics and of the impact on the region and its 
capacity to shape a collective response. This transition is associated to the intertwining of 
a series of new and critical realignments in the international system.
One of these realignments is associated with the crisis of the globalization process and 
of the existing global governance design and, particularly, of the hegemonic model that 
sustained them [2], as we have known it up to now. Precisely, one of the main factors for the 
development and sustainability of the existing structure of global governance currently in 
crisis has been the economic environment in which it was built. An economic environment 
characterized by the intensification of a globalization process associated with processes 
of denationalization and transnationalization. Since the seventies trade flows, investment 
and financing accelerated; production was reshaped by post-fordist innovation combined 
with technological innovation that contributed to the configuration of a global market. As 
a result, global economic interdependence increased significantly while asymmetries and 
inequalities deepened. The emergence and development of globalization entailed risks 
and opportunities for the actors in the international system [3]. Within this framework, 
asymmetric interdependence and inequitable distribution of its benefits contributed to 
generating winners and losers of this process [4], particularly in those nations where the 
middle class grew but at the same time the levels of poverty expanded [2]. However, as 
pointed out in a 2004 report, the problems were not necessarily and exclusively associated 
with economic globalization, but were rooted in the deficiencies of its governance [5].
With the end of the Cold War, global governance emerged as a possibility to organize 
and manage global affairs multilaterally. In the economic sphere with the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) as a reference body but also with the Bretton Woods institutions 
(the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank); in the security field with the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and in the international political sphere with the 
United Nations (UN) and its promotion of a universal and complex multilateralism, 
several mechanisms were set to contribute to the development of rules and norms to 
order the international system. Within this framework, global governance was conceived 
as “governance without government” — an intermediate state between the management of 
global problems through the traditional inter-state policy and the attempt to operationalize 
a world government [6, p. 62]. The absence of a central authority in the international system 
implied, consequently, the need for collaboration and cooperation between different 
actors to develop common objectives, standards and practices in addressing global issues 
and providing global public goods [7, p. 17]2.
The process to foster global governance pivoted on the values promoted by the West — 
the creation and consolidation of international institutions and norms in accordance 
with international law, the promotion of human rights and democracy, and of economic 
liberalization and free trade, within the framework of a predominantly Westphalian 
2 Legler defines global governance as “the resolution of specific global problems through the creation 
of distinct transnational spheres of authority, each of which comprises a different group of actors and a 
particular institutional architecture” [8, p. 254], pointing out the little interest that has awakened its analysis 
among Latin American researchers and academics and highlighting that the G20, in which Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico participate — and whose next meeting will be held in 2018 in Buenos Aires, can reactivate this 
interest [8, p. 266].
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conception of the international system based on the interrelation between states, with the 
eventual participation of other actors [9, p. 13; 10].
On the other hand, globalization3 itself was buttressed by the worldwide development 
of transnational corporations (CTN) that contributed to boost economic liberalization 
and transnationalisation, sometimes in collusion or above the interests of state and 
national sovereignty [11, p. 22–24]4. The growth and sustained development of emerging 
economies — and in particular of China with the comparative advantage of its labor force, 
of new paths of non-liberal capitalist development and of new power relations weakened 
the multilateral institutions. This weakening led some analysts to point out, particularly 
after the global financial crisis of 2008, to the return of rivalries between the great powers 
and to the resurgence of geopolitical competition [12; 13], as the ‘rule-based’ system 
faced challenges and contestations. Within this framework, the globalization originally 
promoted by US hegemony and Western predominance began to benefit primarily China, 
which progressively began to dispute the benefits of this process [14, p. 55].
The new global dynamics associated with emergent economies — beyond the advent 
of the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the continuity 
(with some ups and downs) of the Atlantic alliance between the US and the European 
Union  — was centralized progressively around the two most important powers  — the 
US and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), increasingly in competition. Although 
the US prevails as the hegemonic actor that, together with its Western allies, shaped the 
international liberal order after the Second World War and, especially after the end of 
the Cold War, the accelerated growth of China generated, together with the growth of 
other Asian actors, a gradual shift from the center of world economic dynamism from the 
Atlantic to the Asia Pacific. Paradoxically enough, this significant economic shift didn´t 
happen from North to South — as predicted in the 70’s — but from West to East [16].
With the emergence of new actors and the dispute over the benefits of globalization, 
not only the power relations established after the Second World War come into question, 
but also the stability of the international system. The legitimacy of the rules and values 
of global governance achieved in previous decades began to be questioned with the 
emergence of new institutions (BRICS, Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, the 
BRICS Bank) and norms. Actors such as China and Russia, among others, began to offer 
alternative political models to liberal democracy, while economic growth in the developing 
world accelerated on the basis of political alternatives that responded more to different 
variants of state capitalism than to democratic liberal models [17]. This transition made a 
particular impact on Western conceptions of sovereignty and human rights, by imposing 
conceptions of sovereignty that questioned the liberal cosmopolitan approach to the 
supremacy of human rights over the prerogatives of national sovereignty in domestic 
affairs (as it is the case of the Responsibility to Protect as an international norm [18]). 
The convergence of a series of tendencies associated with the emergence of new powers 
gave rise to a struggle for leadership in the process of shaping global governance, affecting 
3 I refer to the referential text [17] for a more detailed analysis of globalization.
4 As Actis and Busso point out, “Until the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, globali-
zation brought gains for the hegemon. The large American companies controlled the most important link in 
the value chain (technological innovation and knowledge) relegating the production phase to third markets 
with comparative advantages in terms of wages. Thus, the most important income was shared among the 
American multinationals in addition to benefiting the US consumer via prices” [14, p. 54].
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liberal social conceptions, paralyzing existing multilateral institutions and increasing their 
fragmentation and informalization [17]. 
The institutions traditionally established and dominated by the West entered into 
tension with the aspirations and strategies of new power centers. Globalization and 
globalism as its narrative began to be increasingly contested, both by the new international 
actors and by domestic political processes in the West. However, deeper contestations or 
attempts to overthrow the existing order didn´t flourish. Rather, what tended to emerge 
is an order with competing multilateral projects, with different strategic objectives 
and distinctive leadership that generates new forms of geo-economic competition, in 
a framework in which the international liberal order enters into crisis [19; 20]. Thus, 
the international system becomes institutionally and politically more diversified and 
polycentric with higher potential for unrest and conflict [17]. Simultaneously, beyond 
the potential competition among the larger powers — the US and China, — it become 
prone to the development of regionalized cores and pockets under the emergence of an 
economic and geopolitical multipolar system. In this sense, the reinvigoration of various 
modalities of regional cooperation — particularly intense in the Global South since the 
end of the last century — gave rise to a regional activity in which different bilateral, sub-
regional and regional economic and security issues emerged, generating in turn different 
efforts of regional governance [6, p. 61–62].
This new cycle led to an ongoing debate on the crisis of globalization, the development 
of a post-globalization (i.e. a globalization that is still developing, but with new features), 
a de-globalization, an alternative globalization5 or of a pots-liberal [15] or post-Western 
globalization of growing sino-centric accent [22], but with a proactive participation of 
emerging and re-emerging powers (Turkey, Iran, India, Russia) [23].
None of these states rejects the benefits provided by globalization. But, in essence, 
the process raises the possibility of a contradiction between the globalization process 
developed in terms of the exchange of goods, services, people and ideas in a framework 
of growing interdependence and a de-globalization that unfolds through regional 
fragmentation, overlapping regulatory orders and multiple dependencies. And, eventually, 
to a confrontation between the established Western international liberal order and the 
emergence of a potential new Eurasian order, that does not respond to liberal political 
values and that aims to shape new forms of global governance that are less universal 
and more fragmented. In any case, an emerging order that questions the possibility of 
maintaining the cosmopolitan or liberal institutions and norms that emerged in the 
previous stage and that poses risks and new challenges to the global capacity of governing 
the world [17].
Much of this debate in Latin America and the Caribbean is reflected in the document 
resulting from the colloquium organized by CRIES in September 20176 and in the volume 
recently published by CRIES [23]. Most of the analysts agree that this process, although 
contesting institutions, rules and norms of the existing global governance, does not imply 
the reversibility of globalization as developed in recent decades, but its transformation. 
The resulting tension, in turn, has been fully evidenced in the meeting of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) held in Buenos Aires in December 2017, with limited progress on 
5 See in this respect the chapters of the first section of [23].
6 Summary of the high-level international panel “Latin America facing the crisis of globalization and 
the new world order” [25].
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different issues of the previously proposed agenda, but with a clear demarcation between 
the more protectionist visions promoted by the Trump administration and the defense of 
globalization publicly declared by the Chinese government [52]. Paradoxically, the Trump’s 
administration revisionism (and the growing protectionism of the measures it adopts) 
opens opportunities for China and other actors to promote a less liberal international 
order, based on “illiberal” normative models. However, questions remain as to whether 
the sustained expansion of trade, the cross-border flow of capital and the diffusion of new 
technologies, together with the emergence of new international actors, have transformed 
the global economy to a point such as to demand a reform of the existing global order — 
more than its collapse and disappearance [24] — based on contrasting criteria and visions 
to those that have been previously imposed. In essence, globalization does not seem to be 
in question, but the global governance promoted up to now, as well as the modalities that 
could assume the different forms of crystallization of this globalization at the regional and 
national level, together with the norms and values associated with the liberal global order 
raise serious concerns about its future development.
2. Reconfiguration and diffusion of world power: the emerging order
The crisis of globalization and global governance — and eventually of multilateralism 
as such — are associated with the ensuing reconfiguration and diffusion of world power and 
the emergency of a new geopolitical chessboard with the rise of new relevant actors such 
as China, Russia and India [22], together with other actors that project their influence at 
the regional level — be it Japan and Australia or Turkey and Iran. These actors give rise to 
new contending global visions and narratives, which contribute to the promotion of new 
governance modalities and new international standards. The former “rule-makers” of the 
West begin to be challenged or displaced by some actors formerly identified as “rule-takers” 
in the international arena7 (China is often mentioned as an example, but Latin America 
and the Caribbean are also an illustrative case [26, p. 211]), giving rise to a new spectrum 
of emerging “rule makers” and, eventually, of “rule shakers” of the international system. 
The nascent multipolarity, specifically in this phase, is prone to policy errors, rivalries and 
geopolitical tensions. The development of new and multiple geopolitical narratives to read 
the transition, makes the emergence of a new world order more complex and its future 
uncertain. The coexistence of unipolar, multipolar and chaotic forms in a world in which 
a new world order is configured or , according to some analysts, a modality of world dis-
order is imposed8, contribute to create more perplexities than certainties.
Additionally, this new world order responds to a “multiplex” world [27], in which 
multiple actors that reflect a cultural diversity and an unequal distribution of relative 
7 As Hamilton and Pelkmans point out,  “for more than two centuries, either Europeans or Americans, 
or both together, have been accustomed to setting global rules. In the post-World War II era, the US and the 
evolving EU, each in its own way, has been a steward of the international rules-based order. Yet, with the rise 
of new powers, the resurgence of older powers and the emergence of serious challenges at home, Europeans 
and Americans now face the prospect of becoming rule-takers rather than rule-makers, unless they act more 
effectively together to ensure that high standards prevail” [57, p. 3].
8 In fact, Kissinger states that “there has never been a true world order. What we understand by order 
in our time was conceived in Western Europe almost four centuries ago, at a peace conference that took 
place in the Westphalian region of Germany, carried out without the participation and even the knowledge 
of most other continents and civilizations” [9, p. 14].
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power compete on several simultaneous levels. Among these actors are not only national 
states of relative power in the international system that seek to restructure the balances 
of world power, configure areas of regional influence and promote their own interests, 
but also international organizations, transnational corporations, diverse non-state actors 
and geographic regions with a certain level of institutionalization [28]. This complex 
network of actors gives rise to the emergence of a new world that does not reflect the 
interests of a superior hegemonic power, nor even of a group of powers with the sufficient 
capacity to impose its will, in a sustained manner, on the rest, which makes it difficult to 
identify who will determine the new rules of the game for the system. Particularly if there 
is a decline of the hegemonic power of the United States at a global level vis-a-vis the 
emergence of China or the re-emergence and new assertiveness of Russia, Turkey, Iran 
and India, among other actors. In turn, the complex multilevel relations associated with 
this process gives rise to new ways of conceptualizing the relations between economic, 
political and military power, in the framework of a multidimensional chessboard [29], 
linked to new modalities — more complex — of regional structuring, either as new zones 
of influence of more powerful actors, re-emerging civilizational areas or condensations of 
regionalized globalization. As it was already analyzed above, global governance according 
to its Western and Atlanticist patterns is significantly affected by these processes.
However, in many of the studies conducted in Latin America, in the framework of 
this debate, the concern over US hegemonic weight seems to have been displaced by a 
benevolent vision of China’s global projection, with a strong sino-centric emphasis. 
Undoubtedly, the crisis, the fragmentation and restructuring of the US elite since the 
Trump presidency and the very personality of the US president, with all its contradictions 
and ambiguities, contrasts with the coherence of the Chinese elite around the leadership 
of Xi Jinping and the PCCH [53], or the political model imposed by Vladimir Putin [30], 
but also shows that not only the US is undergoing a transformation — internal and in 
terms of its global projection — but also the world as a whole is living an evolution that 
imposes changes to the order established by the 1945 rules [31] and, eventually, by the 
globalization developed since the seventies. In fact, these changes put at stake the stability 
of the world order and the legitimacy of the established norms [9, p. 20].
However, in essence, if the world is changing, it is because not only states, but a 
multiplicity of actors — including TNCs — are faced with the opportunity to conceptualize 
or re-conceptualize their vision of it, to endow this vision of a strategy and a consistent 
narrative and to develop it according to a cognitive map based on their interests, generally 
rooted in their region [28], in a way similar to how an Atlanticist ethnocentric narrative 
emerged at the time, founding the international liberal order based on Western liberal values.
3. Contending geopolitical narratives
On the global level, the narratives that prevailed in previous decades were 
characterized by a bipolar narrative during the Cold War that reflected the balance of 
forces between the US and the USSR; a unipolar narrative after the implosion of the latter 
with the imposition of the hegemony of the US with the support of its Western allies, 
and the more recent emergence of a multipolar narrative  — prevalently economic but 
increasingly geopolitical. Within the framework of the latter, the respective elites have 
developed new narratives, frequently accentuating the importance of the core of regional 
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dynamism, without rejecting the processes of globalization and opening the way to a 
regionalized globalization. The narratives themselves, are basically conceptual road maps 
for the search of strategic objectives of these elites — political, economic and military — in 
a changing world.
Therefore, after an Atlanticist narrative consolidated through decades has emerged 
a narrative of the Asia Pacific — with outstanding elements such as the ascendant and 
predominant role of China as an agent of change  — “the Chinese way”, “the Chinese 
dream”, “the Chinese solution and wisdom” [54]  — in the region in the context of the 
already mentioned shift from the Atlantic and the emphasis on “an Asia for Asians” that 
generates its own tensions and conflicts; several versions of a Eurasian narrative, with 
different cultural and identity nuances and visions and in line with the current strategic 
convergence of China and Russia, and a more reactive narrative of the Indo-Pacific 
promoted by the US, India, Japan and Australia that, despite their strong economic ties 
with China, perceive a threat not only to their influence and to maritime routes in Southeast 
Asia and the Pacific, but also to their economic and political models. The emergence of 
a new Eurasian narrative anchored on the circumstantial strategic convergence of China 
and Russia with the support, among others, of the Central Asia nations through several 
regional mechanisms such as the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization and the recently launched initiative, is leading some analysts to argue that 
Atlantic dominance is not only wearing down but is going to be displaced by an Eurasian 
Century. In this context, is gaining momentum the perception of the emergence of a 
new post-Western world order, increasingly multipolar and polycentric, with the already 
mentioned multiplex dynamics and the emergence of new standards and rules arising from 
the tension between Western and non-Western ideas and values. In fact, we are facing a 
process of transition towards a genuinely multi-polar world — not only in economic but 
also geopolitical terms — within the framework of the configuration of a global agenda 
that is still not clearly reflected in multilateral organizations and that, on the other hand, 
is shaping a mixed system in which centrally planned economies coexist with more open 
economies, generating a more diversified social order that operates in different ways in 
different regions and nations around different priorities and issues of the global agenda 
[32]. In any event, a world order that is not so liberal. While Western values permeate 
this world on a global scale, the established institutional liberal order begin to adapt and 
to coexist with different domestic political systems and with different regional and global 
strategies [33], within the framework of narratives that are associated with distinctive geo- 
economic and geopolitical visions and objectives.
4. Global changes: the challenges for Latin America and the Caribbean
Within the favorable environment of the commodities boom and the rise to power 
of leftist and populist governments and after the deployment of post-liberal [34; 35] or 
post-hegemonic attempts of regionalism [36; 37] in the preceding decade, a substantive 
new situation emerge in the region. This situation not only occurs in the context of a 
reconfiguration of the regional political map, but under the impact of significant exogenous 
factors linked to the current transition of the global order9. The emerging design of a 
9 See in this regard Vigevani and Magnotta [58], Ríos [59] and Ayuso and Gratius [60].
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new global map of the cores of economic and military power, particularly around the 
emergence of new regional powers often legitimated by their own narratives, is becoming a 
key challenge for Latin America and the Caribbean. While the global liberal order is being 
contested or re-examined, the reconfiguration of global and regional powers will have an 
effect of crucial importance for the region in its search of a more effective inclusion in the 
international system in a difficult and complex environment. The development of a period 
of low growth, low integration, weak leadership, lower levels of agreement and higher 
levels of pragmatism, in a more atomized region with limited convergences [38, p. 161; 
39, p. 7]10 questions the previously developed modalities of a “sui-generis” regionalism 
[40], and demands a clearer and collective view of a roadmap to achieve inclusion in the 
international system.
Paradoxically, while the narrative of post-hegemonic or post-liberal regionalism 
privileged inter-governmental political agreements, the role of the State over the market, 
and the search for new models of development, the new regional conjuncture, within the 
framework of the persistence of the region’s asymmetric relations with the most powerful 
players in the emerging global order, tends to privilege a weakening of statism and the 
restoration of neoliberal policies and the importance of the market, accepting and adapting 
the values of global governance imposed by the West.
Despite the significant presence of Latin America and the Caribbean in the institutions 
of international governance — economic (G20, OECD), financial (IMF and World Bank 
at the global level, IDB and CAF at the regional level) and political (UN) [41, p. 55], 
the fragmentation of the region when dealing with the international system is striking. 
Particularly among countries whose “public policies and international action are marked 
by a model of open nationalism and horizontal governance” (such as Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, México y Perú, among others), and those where “still prevail a closed 
nationalism combined with a strong predominance of the State and of a hierarchical 
dirigisme” (Bolivia, Nicaragua, Cuba, Venezuela) [41, p. 59]. Although this division is 
not decisive and show significant nuances, the current trend points to a serious crisis of 
regionalism and to the dilution of the so-called “challenging Latin American regionalism” 
[42] and of South-South cooperation as they were promoted in the previous decade [43, 
p. 64]. In this regard, attempts by the “challenging regionalism” were not able to break 
their complementary role with globalization and its benign or pernicious effects. The 
international economic context continues to build and to determine the relations and 
consequently the strategies for insertion of Latin America and the Caribbean in the 
world, recreating complex linkages between the simultaneous and interwoven processes 
of globalization and regionalization [21, p. 117]. However, the transformations that the 
globalization process currently undergoes, particularly in relation to the deceleration 
of international trade and the increase of protectionism, according to some authors, 
could open new opportunities for the region [45, p. 19]. In this regard, some analysts do 
not hesitate to offer a more optimistic view of the situation, by pointing out that “Latin 
American multilateralism, far from being downcast […] shows unsuspected vigor and 
10 Frenkel and Comini oppose two opposing poles in the region — that of a vision that raises the 
need to deepen the existing global liberal order, favoring and deepening various aspects of the globaliza-
tion process, confronted with an “anti-globalist” vision, which identifies globalization as a system “made to 
measure for large corporations” that Bremmer recreates in his latest book about the winners and losers of 
the globalization process and the political repercussions of this opposition.
Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2019. Т. 12. Вып. 2 147
integrity and even projects itself outside the region with a significant capacity to summon 
and unite wills that few observers would have predicted him” [46, p. 8].
Nevertheless, taking into account its structural vulnerability in a multipolar world, in 
its attempt to “return to the world” or to insert itself more favorably in the international 
system, there is no doubt that since 2013  Latin America is facing a more difficult and 
uncertain global scenario. The gradual reorientation of the Chinese economy towards 
a growth model more focused on the development of the domestic market, together 
with the slow recovery and weak growth of the advanced economies mark the potential 
limits of a model of international insertion based on exports to Asia. The stalemate in 
the negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and in the subsequent “mega-
regional” negotiations of the Transpacific Agreement (TPP) and the Agreement on 
Trade and Transatlantic Investment (TTIP) threatens the whole region in terms of the 
potential imposition of more demanding norms and standards and of the diversion of 
trade and investment. The partial derailment of these agreements since 2016, with the 
rise of protectionist forces or of the frank rejection of free trade in the United States and 
the EU, and the strengthening of state corporations, does not imply, however, a more 
favorable scenario, since it poses risks of greater protectionism and economic nationalism, 
particularly for Latin American countries that are more open to globalization through free 
trade agreements with the US and the EU.
As an analyst [47] rightly points out these events should not be seen as mere short-
term phenomena. On the contrary, they are the expression of a systemic change of what 
can be interpreted as a crisis of transition of globalization and of the hegemonic model 
on which it has been sustained. This crisis of hegemony can open a more uncertain and 
unpredictable period, in which the certainties of the previous stage cannot be taken for 
granted, as in the case of the rapid growth of China and other emerging countries; the 
anchoring of globalization and of liberal internationalism in US hegemony; Atlanticism 
as the pivot of Western security and global governance; the strengthening of liberal 
democracy, the ruling parties and elites of the Western world, or the crucial role of 
multinational corporations. As already mentioned, all of these assumptions are currently 
under scrutiny and raise fundamental questions about the future of global governance.
Within this context, all the actors of the region and the region as a whole will have 
to assess these new scenarios and their short and long-term implications for a better 
international insertion vis-a-vis a global scenario of systemic instability, accelerated changes 
and greater geopolitical risk. However, particularly in South America, the decline of post-
hegemonic and postliberal regionalism cannot be taken as a fait accompli, “although the 
stage of greater politicization of pan-Latinoamericanism and anti-Americanism, appears 
to have diminished” [48, p. 126].
The Latin American narratives that have developed in the last decades — from open 
regionalism to post-liberal or post-hegemonic regionalism — have crystallized in weak 
institutional forms and limited scope in their capacity to generate a regional insertion in 
the international system. However, beyond their critical views, most of these narratives, 
additionally to promoting eventually greater autonomy and diversification of the foreign 
policies of the countries of the region, paradoxically have not questioned the international 
liberal order, as evidenced by the largely persistent alignment of Latin American and 
Caribbean countries with Western countries in voting in the framework of the UN 
(with possible exceptions in certain cases such as Cuba and Venezuela), confirming that 
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notwithstanding the last decade changes the region tend to persist in its role of “extreme 
West” as opportunely pointed out by Rouquié [49]. In essence, most governments of 
the region do not put in question Western values of the existing international order — 
particularly with regard to democracy, human rights, international law and norms, and 
economic liberalization  — and actively participate in global governance bodies that 
emerge from that same liberal order.
Additionally, the region — despite its atomization and heterogeneity — has a series 
of important assets for this participation that  — beyond its economic insertion in the 
international system — can facilitate a more active role in it. One of these assets refers 
to the region as a “zone of peace”, with a substantial reduction of intra- and inter-state 
conflicts, a consistent adherence to nuclear non-proliferation and the establishment of 
regional mechanisms — basically through the creation of “Groups of friendly countries” 
from Contadora and the Rio Group to UNASUR and the Lima Group — that despite a 
performance with ups and downs have contributed to the development of mechanisms for 
conflict resolution and peace-building [6] and regional governance [50].
Based on a predominantly internal dynamic nurtured by the counterpoint between 
two historically rooted legal traditions — one that prioritize national sovereignty and non-
intervention, and the other that has contributed to a significant development of human 
rights — Latin America has been able to develop a series of endogenous norms that turn it 
into a “rule maker” towards the region and that could eventually be projected — through 
a more proactive role — towards a broader sphere if it could reach a regional consensus 
on initiatives aimed at global governance11. As Kacowitz [6] points out, regionally 
Latin America and the Caribbean, despite their peripheral situation in global affairs, 
have managed to build a highly developed and sophisticated system of institutions and 
international law, including a series of regional norms that have regulated both his internal 
conduct and his international behavior. In this regard, perhaps the scarcely highlighted 
inter-American human rights system — that has transcended the borders of the region 
to become a transnational regime with both regional and international impact  — has 
become a reference in the regional context (perhaps in spite of the OAS), below the radar 
of inter-state regional diplomacy [51, p. 234].
Beyond some sporadic cases of “rule breakers”12, perhaps the current global transition 
situation, both geo-economically and geopolitically, could open the doors for a more 
proactive role of the region in various multilateral mechanisms — from the UN to the 
G20 — with a more assertive presence in the promotion of rules of the game more in line 
with its inexorably Western legal and cultural heritage, but from a perspective that does 
not limit or reduce the autonomy that has been achieved so far.
In this sense, the tectonic movements through which the international system 
is crossing can become a magnificent opportunity to build  — both bilaterally and 
multilaterally (as for example, in the case of the reactivation of Mercosur and its 
convergence with the Pacific Alliance, along with the advance of the agreement with the 
EU) — potential consensus for a new Atlantic network and for a more active collective 
11 Possibly the next summit of the G20 in Buenos Aires constitutes a crucial challenge for the articula-
tion of joint positions among the three Latin American members — Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, which, 
at the same time, constitute fundamental referents to advance in the construction of a new architecture of 
regional governance.
12 As the current case of Venezuela illustrates.
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insertion at a global level. Simultaneously, the new opportunities open by global changes 
can contribute to the construction of common spaces which can become platforms based 
on an agenda of cross-cutting issues  — such as technological innovation, connectivity 
and infrastructure  — that go beyond the conventional ones, taking advantage of the 
diversification of relationship patterns with the various actors of the international system, 
beyond the Atlantic framework. In fact, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
has recently proposed the creation of a free trade area for all of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, with Mexico, Brazil and Argentina acting as a “gravitational force” to drag the 
other countries, taking advantage of the convergence between Mercosur and the Pacific 
Alliance [55, p. 15; 56, p. 37].
While the narrative of post-liberal or post-hegemonic regionalism developed at the 
beginning of this century has shown signs of exhaustion, Latin America and the Caribbean 
are going through a complex process of reassembling their abilities in a collective 
search — under new parameters — of an international insertion and of a joint narrative 
that legitimizes it. In essence, a strategic insertion of the region demands both the need to 
manage the new forms of globalization and the geopolitical changes on the global level [14, 
p. 62], as well as shaping a more proactive attitude in governance and the global agenda 
and forging a unifying narrative. These aspirations, complex in itself, are associated with 
a fragmented and diverse perception of the current international and regional dynamics 
and by domestic constraints. However, it compels the need to generate conceptual inputs 
to contribute to recompose or to articulate a vision of the strategies required for a better 
insertion of the region in the changing arena of the international system and possibly 
of the necessary shaping of tools and mechanisms to propel them in a collective and 
inclusive way. As an analyst points out “it is possible to conclude that regionalism in Latin 
America is still in a phase of construction, very dependent on changes in the international 
system in general and the constant changes in the internal politics of the countries most 
committed to regional governance” [49, p. 25]. The global changes underway are, in this 
context, particularly challenging for a region that use to be peripheral to the greater world 
trends and dynamics but has the necessary political, normative and legal capital to play a 
more significant role in the current transition.
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